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Commentary on Senate Confirmation
of Supreme Court Justices: The Roles
of Organized and Unorganized

Interests*
By

GREGORY

A.

CALD~EIA**

INTRODUCTION

Much controversy and concern has arisen over the nomination and appointment of justices to the Supreme Court with
three justices of the "liberal" coalition eighty or more years old
and with at least four or more years of Republican control of
the White House. Indeed, during the presidential election of
1988, both candidates spoke of the importance of appointments
to the Court and promised to choose men and women who
would "interpret the law" or "protect the rights of all citizens."
In light of the precarious ideological balance of force within the
federal judiciary, appointments to the Supreme Court and the

lower courts become even more important in the next few years.
President Reagan did not achieve his desired major shifts in the
decisions of the Supreme Court,' but President Bush will undoubtedly have this opportunity.

Clearly, at this crucial juncture, more and better research is
needed into the dynamics of senatorial decision-making on nominations to the Supreme Court. Actually, political scientists have
* This article represents an expansion of remarks originally delivered as a reaction
to two papers delivered at the Symposium on "The Selection of Judges in the United
States" at the University of Kentucky, September 15-16, 1988.
** Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University. Ph.D., Politics, Princeton
University.
I See, e.g., Baum, Explaining the Burger Court's Supportfor Civil Liberties, 20
POL. Scr. 21 (1987).
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already addressed this issue. 2 But there still is a great deal to

learn, as my comments will suggest.
In the scholarship on nominations to the Supreme Court to
this date, party, ideology, and region have figured most promi-

nently.3 The gravaraen of my argument is that more attention

ought to be given to the influence of constituencies 4 and mobilization by organized interests. Over the past two decades, the
number of interest groups in American politics has exploded, 5

and therefore, there is potential impact not only on Congress6
and the executive branch but there is also impact on the courts.
There is much historical evidence on the potent roles of constit-

uencies and organized groups in the consideration of nominees
to the Supreme Court. Empirically oriented political scientists

need to analyze this information. This criticism is not directed
against particular scholars but, rather, more generally against

those who study the phenomenon of judicial selection at the
national level.
I.

CRITIQUE

The articles by Segal7 and Felice and Weisberg8 address two

different facets of the same basic question: How and why do
2 Felice & Weisberg, The Changing Importance of Ideology, Party, and Region
in Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 1953-1988, 77 Ky. L.J. 509 (1988-89);
Segal, Cover, & Cameron, The Role of Ideology in Senate Confirmation of Supreme
Court Justices, 77 Ky. L.J. 485 (1988-89).
1 See, e.g., H. ABRAHtAm, JUSTICas AND PRESIDENTS (1974); Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominations: From Reconstruction to
the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CA Dozo L. Rsv. 1 (1983-84); Segal, Senate
Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisanand InstitutionalPolitics, 49 J. POL.
998 (1987); Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confirmation of Supreme
Court Nominees, 13 L. & Soc'Y REv. 927 (1978-79); Sulfridge, Ideology s a Factorin
Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations, 42 J. POL. 560 (1980).
For general literature on legislative voting, see Collie, Voting Behavior in Legislatures, in HANDBOOK OF LEGiSLATvE RESEARCH (Loewenberg, Patterson, and Jewell, eds.,
1985).
, As used in this article, "constituencies" means unorganized interests, such as
blacks, farmers, women, etc.
See, e.g., J. BERRY, Tim INTEREST GROUP SocmIY (1984).
6 On organized interests, see K. ScILozm" AND J. TImRNEY, ORoANIZED INTERESTS AND AimUcAN DEMOCRACY (1986).
Segal, Cover, and Cameron, supra note 2.
8 Felice & Weisberg, supra note 2.
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senators vote as they do on nominations to the Supreme Court?
First, I will discuss the article by Felice and Weisberg and then
the article by Segal. Out of deference to the lengthy expositions
of their views put forth elsewhere in this Journal,I shall make
no attempt to summarize their articles in an authoritative fashion, but rather, will reiterate only enough to put my criticism
and comments in context.
Felice and Weisberg ask the questions of how and why
senators voted on controversial nominations to the Supreme
Court since the administration of Eisenhower. Straightforward
and familiar measures of key variables are used: 'Partisanship,
region, and ideology-as measured by roll calls tallied by the
Americans for Constitutional Action-and degree of support by
the senator for the president's program as compiled by Congressional Quarterly. Their results strongly suggest ideology was
a motivating force in the nominations of Fortas as chief justice,
Haynsworth, Carswell, and Rehnquist as associate justices, and
again with Rehnquist as chief justice. In the nominations of
Stewart and Marshall, region played the prominent role, with
southern senators voting against those nominations in response
to desegregation. Strikingly, in the nomination of Bork, partisanship was the most important determinant, with ideology being
somewhat less important.
The preeminence of ideology across this set of nominations,
together with the minimal role of party and region is, in my
view, remarkable. For, at least in the nominations of Carswell,
Haynsworth, and Fortas, one would have suspected regionalism
to play an important role. Of course, the party is always important in voting in Congress. To a certain extent, the above
results contradict my notions of voting on most matters before
Congress. I shall discuss the reason for this contradiction after
I review Segal's article.
Like Felice and Weisberg, Segal also deals with senate voting
on the nomination of Supreme Court justices. Whereas Felice
and Weisberg take the controversial nature of a nomination more
or less as a given, Segal focuses on how and under what circumstances a senator will cast a negative vote. Segal suggests that a
vote against a president's nominee is costly and that senators
will vote against the nominee only if they believe that there is a

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 77

chance of defeat. Opposition to the president is costly and that
is why presidents' nominations are seldom rejected.
The political environment, whether the nomination comes
late in a president's term and whether the president's party
controls the Senate, will have an influence on whether a senator
votes to reject. Two variables-ideological distance between the
nominee and a senator and the candidate's qualifications-should
provide reasons for a senator's vote. The notion is that a senator
will not vote purely on partisan or ideological grounds absent
some plausible reason. Segal specifies that party, qualifications,
and ideological distance will affect senate choices in a linear
manner. Interestingly, the political environment will condition
the use of ideological distance as part of the senatorial calculus,
and qualifications and ideological distance will have a multiplicative effect on senate voting.
What is striking and new about Segal's article is the use of
new measures, multiplicative terms, and cost in voting against a
presidential nomination. Some of the results are straightforward,
while others are somewhat surprising. Clearly, senators who are
members of the president's party are more likely to vote for a
nomination. A favorable political environment for the president,
together with ideological distance, has an impact on senate voting. Also, a candidate's qualifications influence confirmation.
The combination of a nominee's qualifications and ideological
distance markedly affects the senatorial calculus. But, interestingly, ideological distance has no direct effect on voting; its
influence is conditioned by the political environment. Thus, senators do not, except under certain, well-specified conditions, cast
votes on ideological grounds in considering nominations to the
Supreme Court. That strikes this author as an appealing and
counterintuitive finding.
Both articles are important and well-done, but, as always,
there are a number of points in the two articles about which
reasonable people will disagree. In some cases the authors have
done what anyone would have, given the data available, and I
intend not so much to take them to task but rather to muse
about our collective difficulties as scholars who wish to understand the politics of senate voting on nominations to the Supreme Court. I shall first discuss technical issues and then move
to more substantive questions.
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Segal takes an ingenious approach. But the measure of qualifications and ideological distance will cause controversy. Some
people will simply not believe that one can measure a candidate's
qualifications or ideology, or even perceptions of them, by content analysis of editorial reactions in leading newspapers. Should
we expect the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune to
agree on Bork's ideology and qualifications? If the various newspapers do not agree, do we nevertheless simply lump the scores
together? Which newspaper's editorials best capture the public's
and Senate's perceptions of the nominees? Further, I doubt that
these measures are really independent of other variables in the
model. For instance, there is evidence that the White House
makes a systematic effort to influence editorial reactions by
sending out "press kits" and mocked up editorials to the newspapers. Obviously, the newspapers in Segal's study are not the
sort one would expect to crib heavily from the White House's
packet, but they may react to telephone calls and letters, for
example. 9 More importantly, it is likely that the White House's
and its opponents' attempts to influence public perceptions are
themselves a result of their own perceptions of the political
environment and partisan situation.
Segal engaged in intriguing speculation about the consequences of the Reagan Administration nominating Scalia first
and Bork second. Based on statistical analysis, Segal suggests
the distinct possibility of both Bork and Scalia winning confirmation if Bork had gone before the Senate first. The flaw in
this analysis is the assumption that evaluations of Scalia's political ideology and qualifications would have remained the same
in 1987. In the fall of 1987, with the Democrats controlling the
Senate and President Reagan in lame-duck state, those who
opposed Bork surely would have made an attempt to manipulate
public and elite perceptions of Scalia's political ideology and
qualifications. After all, Bork's enemies pursued precisely that
strategy in 1987. Advertising on television and in newspapers,
press conferences, direct mall, and grass-roots lobbying were

9 For example, President Johnson and his staff made calls and wrote letters to
editors in the fight over Fortas' nomination as Chief Justice. See generally B. MURPHY,
FoRTAs: Tim RISE AND RUIN OF A S.UPREaME COURT JUSTCE (1988); N. MCFEELEY,
APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES: THi JOHNSON PESIDENCY (1987).
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used in order to cast doubt on whether Bork's judicial philosophy was in the mainstream of American politics. To reiterate a
previous point: evaluations of qualifications and political ideology may be endogenous variables-that is, themselves the result
of variables inside or outside the statistical model.
Another technical criticism is that the Senate took only voice
votes in some of the nominations. Felice and Weisberg disregarded those nominations. However, Segal included the nominations decided on voice votes, but it is not clear whether the
voice votes were counted as unanimous. It is clear that voice
votes are often meant to override significant opposition and
make it unnecessary for senators to take a position on a controversial matter. Thus, for example, in the confirmation of Fortas
as associate justice, the Senate took a voice vote but several
senators made their opposition well known.
Moving on to more substantive issues, the use of summary
indices of roll calls, whether it be from the Americans for
Democratic. Action (ADA) or the Americans for Constitutional
Action (ACA), as measures of senate political ideology raises
important and troublesome issues. Both articles use summary

indices of roll calls to stand for the ideological predispositions
of a senator. Unfortunately, ADA and ACA scores, based on
votes on a set of important issues, are the result of many of the
same processes the authors hypothesize as determinants of votes
on nominations to the Supreme Court. Surely, in part, ADA
and ACA scores summarize the representational linkage on prior
measures. Those who formulate such ratings would undoubtedly
include a vote on a nomination to the Supreme Court in their
indices. If that is correct, then both sets of authors probably
overestimate the effects of ideology and underestimate the impact of party and constituency. This may explain Felice and
Weisberg's position on several nominations in which region should
have made a big difference but did not.
II.

POINT OF DEPARTURE: ORGANIZED AND UNORGANIZED
INTERESTS

I do not have a quick or easy solution to the problems I
have outlined. But I do think my comments point out the need
to understand the impact of organized and unorganized constituencies on the politics of nominations to the Supreme Court. In
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both articles, constituency as a variable plays a relatively minor
role in the modeling process. This is partly a result of the
inability to measure the effects of constituency and partly a

result of scholarly perceptions of senators and the White House
on nominations to the Court. Until recently, nominations to the
Supreme Court have been debated almost entirely within elite
circles. The president and Senate have, traditionally, dealt directly with one another on these nominations. Somewhere along
the line, perhaps during the Nixon Administration or during the
fight over Fortas' elevation to chief justice, the president and
various organized interests began to mobilize senatorial constituencies in favor of and in opposition to nominations to the
Supreme Court. 10 No longer did the president and interest groups
engage only in direct lobbying of senators; they began to draw
on and mobilize key people and groups back home in the states.
During the latter part of the 1980s, culminating in the massive
mobilization of interests to defeat Bork in 1987, fights over
controversial nominations to the federal courts have increasingly
become constituency-driven events."
CONCLUSION

Over the last nine months, a colleague12 and I have researched the involvement and influence of various interest groups
1oMobilizations of this sort do have a precedent in the twentieth century. Labor
and various black interest groups used tactics such as writing letters and telegrams and
placing advertisements in newspapers in order to defeat the nomination of Parker to the
Supreme Court in 1930. See W. BUus, DuTY AND THE LAW: JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER
AND THE CONSTrrTUoTN (1987); Fish, Spite Nominations to the Supreme Court: Herbert
Hoover, Owen J. Roberts, and the Politics of Political Vengeance in Retrospect, 77 Ky.
L.J. 545 (1988-89); Watson, The Defeat of Judge Parker:A Study in Pressure Groups
and Politics, 50 Mississippi VAuEY HIsr. REv. 213 (1963-64).
Qualitatively, the strategies and tactics used against Parker resemble those mustered
against Carswell, Haynsworth, and Bork. But efforts on previous nominations differ in
important respects from the mobilizations against Bork and others. Today, many more
organizations are involved in supporting or defeating nominations. These organizations
approach work on nominations more systematically than did their predecessors, and
more importantly, both liberal and conservative organizations "interested" in judicial
nominations have become well institutionalized in our society.
" See P. McGUIGAN
D J. O'CoNNLmL, THE JUDGES WAR (1987); H. SclwARz,
PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE ma CONSTITUTION
(1988); see also TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: THE REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY

FUND

TASK FORCE ON THE APPOINTMENT OF FEDERAL JUDGES

(1988).
2.

Professor John R. Wright, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa.
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in the confirmation and rejection of federal judicial nominations.
We began our research by studying the defeat of Bork. But, as
we have interviewed participants and reviewed the evidence, it
has become apparent that the fight over Bork's nomination was
not an isolated, idiosyncratic event. It is simply the high-water
mark, for now at least, of the influence of organized interests
in federal judicial nominations. I believe, however, that organized group mobilization and pressure on controversial judicial
nominations has become a permanent feature of our political
landscape. Presently, there are over 100 conservative and around
300 liberal organizations that take or have taken a position on
nominations. This conflict has become institutionalized. More
importantly, these coalitions remain poised to do battle on the
next controversial nomination. No longer do the Senate and the
White House have control over the decision to reject or confirm;
interest groups have injected themselves into the process, and
they have brought constituency politics with them. As we study
the politics of judicial confirmations, we need to integrate this
new phenomenon into our models and analyses.

